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NO. 48 DECEMBER 2019 Introduction 
The European Commission’s 
Enhanced Rule of Law Mechanism 
Molly O’Neal 
The new European Commission has signaled its commitment to advance the work 
of its predecessor in asserting European Union (EU) authority to prevent – and, if 
necessary, respond to – breaches in the rule of law by member states. A new toolbox 
of measures to accomplish this aim would build upon the Rule of Law Framework, 
adopted in 2014, and rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
requiring compliance by member country courts and judicial systems with EU legal 
principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The first two principal 
aims of the reinforced toolbox of measures are to foster, through public outreach, a 
rule of law culture across the EU, and to expand the scope of monitoring and report-
ing to all member countries while deepening the Commission’s institutional expertise 
to achieve a timely and detailed understanding of developments. The third aim is to 
reinforce the leverage of the EU to respond in cases where there is serious deviation 
from rule of law norms. This latter aspect of the reinforced “toolbox” includes adopt-
ing a strategic approach to bringing anti-infringement cases to the CJEU and the 
introduction of rule of law conditionality to EU funding in member countries. 
 
The incoming president of the Commission, 
Ursula von der Leyen, incorporated in the 
programmatic political guidelines for her 
presidency an explicit commitment to the 
intensified effort to uphold the rule of law. 
She called for an additional comprehensive 
European Rule of Law Mechanism that 
would be applicable across all member 
countries and offer a uniform approach to 
monitoring and reporting on each member 
country by the Commission. She cited the 
recent rulings of the CJEU as a basis for 
asserting the competence of the Commis-
sion as a guarantor of the rule of law. She 
also endorsed the proposal to make the rule 
of law an integral part of the Multiannual 
Financial Framework for 2021–2027. 
The proposed measures, detailed in the 
Commission’s Rule of Law Blueprint for 
Action of July 17, build upon European 
Parliament (EP) resolutions calling for a 
stronger Union stance on the rule of law, 
recent CJEU rulings, and the firm endorse-
ment by von der Leyen, as well as by the 
two unsuccessful candidates for the Com-
mission presidency, Manfred Weber and 
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Frans Timmermans. The full enactment of 
these measures is anticipated to be a key 
work strand of the incoming Commission. 
Article 2 of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) states that the Union is founded 
on the shared values of democracy, the rule 
of law, and respect for fundamental rights. 
Article 19 TEU entrusts national courts to 
ensure the full application of EU law. Effec-
tive judicial protection by independent 
courts is required by Article 19(1) as a con-
crete expression of the rule of law. Deficien-
cies in the rule of law can encompass threats 
to the independence of the judiciary, arbi-
trary or unlawful decisions by public 
authorities, limited availability or ineffec-
tiveness of judicial remedies, and failure to 
implement higher court judgments. The 
three pillars of the reinforced rule of law 
approach led by the Commission are pro-
motion, prevention, and response. 
Promotion of a Shared Rule of 
Law Culture and Prevention 
of Breaches 
The Commission plans to engage the Euro-
pean public across many dimensions to 
raise awareness of the centrality of rule 
of law to the values and functioning of 
the EU, and it will sponsor efforts by civil 
society actors and academia to support 
public understanding of this issue. The 
Commission plans to strengthen coopera-
tion with the Council of Europe (Venice 
Commission and GRECO) as well as with the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe and – where rule of law inter-
sects economic policies – the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment. It will also build upon the work of 
European judicial networks and the co-
operation among member states’ constitu-
tional courts. The Commission calls on the 
EP, the Council, and member state govern-
ments to bring complementary efforts to 
the promotion of a rule of law culture. 
The key feature of the prevention pillar 
of the new toolbox is the introduction of 
monitoring of rule of law performance 
across all member countries – a proposal 
first advanced by the German and Belgian 
foreign ministers in April 2019. There 
will be a Rule of Law Review cycle and an 
annual rule of law report based on an 
enhanced and constant dialogue with all 
member states through a network of con-
tact persons. This process is intended to 
ensure that the Commission can react early 
to emerging situations rather than seek to 
roll back challenges to the rule of law. The 
intensified monitoring and reporting will 
help to demonstrate to member states and 
publics that any EU action taken to respond 
to rule of law breaches is objective, pro-
portionate, and non-discriminatory. 
Response Pillar: The Court of 
Justice of the European Union 
The new toolbox will build on significant 
CJEU rulings in 2018 and 2019 and adopt a 
strategic approach to addressing rule of law 
challenges by bringing anti-infringement 
cases to the CJEU. In a 2018 case (related to 
a salary dispute by judges in Portugal), the 
CJEU ruled that member states are “required 
by Union law to ensure that their courts 
meet the requirements of effective judicial 
protection” and that “the independence of 
national courts is essential to ensure such 
judicial protection.” This ruling under-
pinned subsequent rulings related to 
aspects of Poland’s judicial overhaul. 
The first of these cases contested Polish 
legislation passed in 2017 that would have 
retroactively imposed a lowered retirement 
age of 65 on Supreme Court judges – a 
measure that would have forced the retire-
ment of 27 of the 72 Supreme Court judges 
then serving. The law also provided that 
Supreme Court judges could serve beyond 
the age of 65 on application to the Minister 
of Justice, whose decision whether to ex-
tend tenure had no explicit criteria and 
would not be subject to judicial review. 
In response to these proposed measures, 
the European Commission brought a com-
plaint under the anti-infringement pro-
cedure to the CJEU in July 2018. The April 
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2019 opinion of the Court’s Advocate 
General stated that the legislation lowering 
the retirement age for Supreme Court 
judges violates the principles of irremov-
ability of judges and of judicial independ-
ence. The government of Poland complied 
with the finding, in keeping with the 
CJEU’s accelerated procedure. The CJEU 
confirmed this finding in its ruling on June 
24, 2019. In a second case brought by the 
Commission, the CJEU ruled on November 
5 that a law that lowered the mandatory 
retirement ages for judges in the Common 
Courts – to age 65 for men and 60 for 
women – was inconsistent with EU law. 
The CJEU ruled on November 19 on a 
complaint brought by several sitting Polish 
Supreme Court judges challenging the in-
dependence of the newly created Discipli-
nary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court. 
The members of this Chamber are elected 
by the National Council of the Judiciary 
(NCJ), a body formerly elected by judges 
themselves, but that is now appointed by 
the parliament’s governing majority on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice. 
In his opinion, published on June 27, the 
Advocate General found that the Discipli-
nary Chamber does not satisfy the require-
ments of judicial independence established 
by EU law. He argued that any properly 
functioning judicial council (in this case the 
NCJ) must not be under the influence of 
the legislative or executive authorities. The 
final CJEU ruling in this case lays out the 
legal standard for independence that must 
be met under EU law, but it calls for the Po-
lish Supreme Court itself to rule on whether 
the Disciplinary Chamber is independent. 
Response Pillar: 
Conditioning EU Funding on Rule 
of Law Performance 
A regulation proposed by the Commission 
in May 2018 argues for protection of the EU 
budget in case of “generalized deficiencies 
as regards the rule of law” in member states. 
The EP adopted the regulation on first read-
ing with amendments in April 2019. It 
remains to be finalized and adopted by the 
Council. This regulation is expected to be 
effective with the adoption of the Multi-
annual Financial Framework, and its ration-
ale builds upon rules already in place that 
condition EU funding on indicators of 
macroeconomic stability. 
Under this regulation, the Commission 
would be given the authority to recom-
mend to the Council to reduce EU funding 
in a “proportionate” way that is based upon 
evidence of generalized deficiencies in the 
rule of law in a member country. Measures 
could involve the suspension or reduction 
of funding under existing commitments, or 
a prohibition on new commitments to spe-
cific categories of recipients. The regulation 
includes procedures for the prompt lifting 
of measures when the member country can 
show the deficiencies have been corrected. 
The argument in favor of the regulation 
is framed on the responsibility for the EU to 
use its budgetary resources effectively and 
without undue risk – a well-established 
principle. The regulation makes the case 
that, if the rule of law is systematically 
flawed, EU funding cannot achieve its core 
aims. It specifies that the rule of law im-
plies that “the principles of legality, legal 
certainty, prohibition of arbitrariness of the 
executive powers, separation of powers, and 
effective judicial protection by independent 
courts are respected.” 
This regulation would come into force 
beginning on January 1, 2021, and it would 
provide major new leverage to the Union 
vis-à-vis member states where rule of law 
norms have been breached. Although pre-
sented as a fiduciary measure, the new 
regulation would also operate as a sanction, 
complementary to the Article 7(1) TEU pro-
cedure. 
Stalled Article 7 Procedures 
To date, Poland has been the sole test case 
of the Rule of Law Framework of 2014, 
beginning with the launch in early 2016 of 
consultations on the status of judges elected 
to the Constitutional Tribunal by the out-
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going Sejm (parliament) in 2015. The Com-
mission’s concerns about the changes to the 
Tribunal’s composition did not persuade 
the government to change course. Conse-
quently, the independent check on execu-
tive and legislative power provided by the 
Tribunal, as envisaged under the Polish con-
stitution, has been substantively weakened. 
The Commission in December 2017 put 
a proposal based on Article 7(1) TEU to the 
Council, stating in particular that the con-
stitutionality of laws in Poland could “no 
longer be verified and guaranteed by an 
independent constitutional tribunal.” The 
Polish case is backed by a detailed legal 
argument from the Commission. The Coun-
cil held three hearings in 2018 on the Po-
lish case. The Commission has not applied 
the 2014 Rule of Law Framework to the case 
of Hungary. However, on September 12, 
2018, the EP adopted a resolution invoking 
Article 7 and calling on the Council to con-
sider the risk of a serious breach of foun-
dational EU values by Hungary. The Coun-
cil held a hearing on the Hungary case 
in September 2019 and has scheduled a 
further hearing for December 10. 
The application of Article 7 has a high 
decision threshold (unanimity) and depends 
on the willingness of member states to take 
firm action. Because the procedure is excep-
tional by nature, action-forcing deadlines 
have not been adopted. Consequently, the 
cases against Poland and Hungary have not 
gathered much momentum. 
Prospects for Success of the 
New Toolbox 
The stronger position of the Eurosceptic 
right in the newly elected parliament may 
favor efforts by some member countries to 
force a retrenchment of EU ambitions to 
uphold a uniform standard for judicial 
independence across all member states. 
However, the loss of seats by the center-
right and center-left has been matched by 
gains by the Renew Europe (liberal) and 
Green factions, who generally endorse a 
common EU defense of fundamental prin-
ciples such as rule of law. The nationalist 
right Identity and Democracy faction in the 
parliament claims to have been crucial to 
von der Leyen’s election and may hope 
to exert leverage over the enactment of her 
program. On the other hand, Donald Tusk’s 
anticipated election to lead the parliament’s 
largest faction, the European People’s Party, 
will allow him to offer strong support to the 
Commission’s rule of law ambitions and 
could contribute to streamlining Article 7 
proceedings. 
As one of three executive vice presidents 
in the new Commission, Timmermans will 
not have responsibility for pressing the rule 
of law agenda, but he has led the design 
and advocacy of the new toolbox. Enacting 
and applying the enhanced rule of law 
mechanism will be among the responsibili-
ties of the new Vice President for Values 
and Transparency, Vera Jourova, a Czech 
citizen. Her appointment signals that rule 
of law is not an alien imposition on a few 
member countries, but rather is embraced 
by all members for application to all mem-
bers. As the Commissioner for Justice, Con-
sumers and Gender Equality under the 
outgoing Commission, Jourova has been 
a vocal advocate of stronger rule of law 
measures and endorsed the linkage of EU 
funding to rule of law compliance. 
Although the CJEU has established the 
legal basis for EU competence on judicial 
independence, the Court can only react to 
member state legislation rather than pre-
empt violations of core EU principles. The 
new EU toolbox aims to avert where pos-
sible, and sanction where necessary, 
significant challenges to the rule of law on 
the part of any member country. Its most 
consequential instrument – the proposed 
cuts to EU funding where there are rule 
of law deficiencies – could yet be vitiated 
by procedural limitations introduced by 
opponents. 
Dr Molly O’Neal is a Visiting Fellow in the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
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